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Art and the anthropologists1  
I saw among them wonderful works of art and marvelled at the 
subtle ingenuity of people in strange lands (Albrecht Dürer)2 
To recognise another‘s material culture as worthy of the highest 
treatment our society accords artifacts—that is, to consider 
them art and display them in art museums—is to honour and 
esteem not just the artifacts but also their makers.3 
 
We are familiar with the idea that a cow may be a work of art—when preserved in 
formaldehyde. What about living cows? Not those that might be herded into the Tate 
Gallery in search of prizes, but uncurated cows, grazing peacefully in places with few 
institutions to constitute an art world, no prizes to be had, and no general term in use 
that translates naturally as ―art‖. The Dinka people, along with other Nilitic groups 
with whom they share a common history, are cattle breeders. They are highly 
appreciative, apparently, of the colours, patterns and shapes their cattle provide 
them with. And this is not wholly a matter of the appreciation of nature rather than 
artefact, though it may be that there is a higher degree of recognition of the natural in 
their responses to cattle than we associate with old master paintings. Breeds of 
cattle are, surely, artefacts.  They are things we make, in the sense that we govern, 
to a considerable extent, both their production and their characteristics. We do not 
make them in the ways that we make stone tools or computers; we exploit natural 
patterns of reproduction to do the post-selection work for us. But a dependence on 
natural processes of causation does not generally compromise our claim to make 
art; think of the action of acid in etching. 
 
Anthropologists say that the Dinka do not breed for the prized colours and patterns--
the patterns not being predictable--and that a bull with the right kinds of markings is 
often castrated. But they do ensure that plain black and red are used as stud bulls, 
trusting that this will result occasionally in the piebald form. Other aspects of the 
cattle‘s appearance are aesthetically important and are more obviously a result of 
intentional manipulation: horns are cut in distinctive ways so as to encourage 
increased size as well as regrowth in desirable patters, for which there is a special 
set of terms; they are further emphasised by hanging buffalo-tail hair tassles from 
them4 The castration of piebald bulls makes salient their non-functional status and 
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results in increased size and a more glossy coat, rendering these animals even more 
aesthetically desirable.5 It is stressed that ―bigness and fatness are not appreciated 
because they will lead to a better price at market, or to a larger meal on the death or 
sacrifice of the animal: cattle are primarily a feast for the eyes, and only secondarily 
a feast for the stomach.‖6 Evans-Pritchard tells us that a large hump which wobbles 
when the animal walks is much admired, and to exaggerate this feature owners often 
manipulate the hump shortly after birth.7 While cattle are vital commodities for these 
people, a great deal of attention seems to be paid to their aesthetic refinement, and 
not merely as a byproduct of other concerns.  
 
That attention is reflected in a complex critical vocabulary. Jeremy Coote quotes a 
slightly earlier opinion on the connoisseur-like reflection of Nilitic people on their 
biological artefacts:  
 
When discussing the colour pattern of an animal—as they do for hours—the 
Dinka sound more like art critics than stockbreeders. For instance, when does 
mathiang—dark brown—become malual—reddish brown? If the animal has 
brown patches, are they large enough to make it mading or are they the 
smaller mottling that identifies malek?8 
 
Appreciation of the cattle helps to enrich the aesthetic and imaginative activity of 
these people in other ways: their cattle‘s appearance is celebrated in song; they 
delight in, and elaborate on, connections between the cattle and the owner-maker in 
ways that involve complex patterns of metanomic transfer wherein makers are 
ascribed characteristics in virtue of the quality of their products:  
 
…amongst the Western Dinka… a man with a black display ox may be known 
not only as macar ‗black ox‘, but also as, for example, ‗tim atiep, ―the shade of 
a tree‖; or kor acom, ―seeks for snails‖, after the black ibis which seeks for 
snails‘.9 
 
Personal ornaments imitate the shape of horns, while certain bodily attitudes 
regarded as graceful are imitations of the rearing horns or slow gallop. Clay 
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models of their cattle, sometimes quite abstractly fashioned, serve in the pretend 
play of children. 
2 Universal art 
So, are the Dinka cattle works of art? There are choices open to us in answering that 
question and I‘ll consider them later. But it‘s worth noting that those around in the 
early days of systematic anthropology were struck by the apparently universal 
impetus to aesthetic activity in human kind, and took a very inclusive view of what 
counts as art. Once they had been convinced that biological things can also be 
artefacts, it would not have been much of a stretch to include the Dinka cattle.10 
Franz Boas, a founder of social anthropology, is sometimes cited as an advocate---
indeed, as the inventor--of cultural relativism. Yet his book Primitive Art (1927) 
sounds a strongly universalistic note:  
 
In one way or another esthetic pleasure is felt by all members of mankind. No 
matter how diverse the ideals of beauty may be, the general character of the 
enjoyment of beauty is of the same order everywhere…11 
 
Nor was Boas a relativist about aesthetic merit, content to say that the works of art of 
all communities are good in their own ways; while he praised the work of most 
―uncontaminated primitive manufacturers‖ to the extent that ―most objects of 
everyday use must be considered as works of art‖ he remarked on the lack of skill 
shown by painters in Tierra del Fuego and the ―imperfect control‖ exhibited in 
Melanesian painting and carving (1927: 23-4). Boas felt able, it seems, to apply his 
own taste to the products of diverse cultures, delivering judgements, at least in broad 
terms, of their quality.  And that, despite the warnings of more recent 
anthropologists, is what large numbers of people interested in the artefacts of other 
cultures do, and have done at least since Roger Fry‘s admiring commentary on 
African sculpture.12 We might treat this as evidence of our own uneducable 
crassness, our insatiable appetite for cultural appropriation, our insensitivity to 
cultural difference--or as an indication that there is, after all, something genuinely 
universal to the aesthetic values and interests of human kind. The latter view (I‘ll call 
it Universalism)is suggested by the philosopher John McDowell, when he says that 
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―…it is remarkable, and heartening, to what extent, without loosing hold of the 
sensitivities from which we begin, we can learn to find worth in what at first seems 
too alien to appreciate‖.13 Art, we may say, is not merely universal, it is open: 
appreciating the art of societies radically different from our own does require effort, 
sympathy and a desire to know how other people live; it does not require a 
fundamental shift in our vision or values.  
 
The doctrine of Openness is not concerned only with our efforts to comprehend the 
art of alien societies; it‘s a general claim about the passage from untutored looking to 
moderately or highly appreciative engagement. As Chis Jannaway puts it: ―The 
untutored judge and the expert critic are on a continuum. The elaborations of critical 
discourse enable one to see and judge beauty more finely and in more challenging 
material, but should not be mistaken for an acquisition of the capacity to apprehend 
beauty.‖14 Just as a young person in our own society, knowing nothing yet of western 
art history but struck by the beauty of an early renaissance painting, may be drawn in 
to the world of art, learning more and appreciating better as time goes by, so 
someone who knows nothing of the culture of a contemporary society very different 
from our own, is not thereby precluded from beginning a journey of aesthetic 
discovery. That‘s the view I want to defend. 
 
Before I do, I should make some clarificatory points. On the formulation I just gave, 
there seem to be two components to the view: one (Universalism) says that art is 
everywhere, while the other (Openness) says that we are able, in principle, to 
appreciate it anywhere we find it. Is there really a difference between them? One 
reason or doubting that there is a difference would be the belief that each entails the 
other, making them logically equivalent. In fact, neither entails the other. Openness 
does not entail Universalism; Openness means simply that people have some 
capacity to appreciate art from where ever it may come; Universalism claims 
additionally that it may come from any culture. Does Universalism entail Openness?   
Some people, touched, perhaps, by the philosophical doctrine called verificationism, 
will argue that the truth of Universalism requires the truth of Openness. For it makes 
no sense, they say, to claim that there is art in that culture over there of which I have 
no artistic appreciation whatever. For what then would support my claim that the stuff 
in question is art? I reject this argument, claiming that we might have good reasons 
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for thinking that something is art without being able to bring to it any of our art-
relevant responses. We might, for example, identify it as art on functional grounds, 
noting that the stuff in question functions in that society much as art functions in our: 
it gets displayed and discussed, prizes are awarded, the people of that society claim 
to get pleasure from its contemplation, etc. That said, I‘ll be arguing mostly for 
Openness; that seems to me to be the idea that has caused the most controversy in 
anthropology.   
 
Secondly, my ambition here is not to establish the truth of the doctrine of Openness 
in all its generality. Thus stated, it may well be false. My position will not collapse if 
that is so. My point is that Openness is much closer to the truth than alternative 
doctrines we hear much about, according to which art and aesthetics are concepts 
that do not travel beyond the boundaries of recent and contemporary western 
societies. It‘s not quite true that the Earth is spherical, but someone who believes it is 
has a much better grip on reality than someone who thinks it is a cube. The right way 
to proceed, once we have seen how attractive Openness is, is then to decide what 
adjustments we need to make to Openness in order to get to the truth. This will be 
no trivial undertaking (determining the exact shape of the earth wasn‘t easy either). 
And making the adjustments may tell us interesting things about the real limits of 
aesthetic generality. But I will not have space to attempt that task here.  
 
Third, Universalism is a claim about all societies, not about all individuals. No doubt 
there is a good deal of variation among the individuals in any given society in terms 
of sensitivity to and interest in art. Perhaps some individuals have no such sensitivity 
or interest. Correspondingly, Openness is not the claim that all individuals are open 
to the art of other cultures—some may indeed not be open to the art of their own 
culture.15    
Forth, the doctrine of Openness sounds like good news: there is a whole world of art 
out there, and we may look forward to enjoying it. But a sensible defence of 
Openness will insist that this optimism needs significant qualification, at some of 
which I have already hinted. We can‘t appreciate Yoruba sculpture or Inuit face 
masks or Nilitic cattle to the fullest, or even to a satisfactory extent without the 
training provided by substantial acquaintance with the works concerned, substantial 
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knowledge of the techniques involved, and a good deal of insight into the broader 
role of these activities in the societies which nurture them. That‘s true of the art of 
our own past and present, and it‘s a truth that puts severe practical limits on our 
capacities to appreciate that art. In thinking seriously about the relative merits of the 
plans of Ghiberti and Brunelleschi for the Florence Baptistery doors, we would not 
give weight to the opinion of someone with no knowledge of the work of either artist, 
no understanding of church architecture, and no acquaintance with biblical stories or 
Renaissance history.16 If we want help in tuning our own aesthetic responses we 
look to people who score highly on all these dimensions of expertise. But for all that, 
we don‘t insist that people take art history courses before they are allowed in to art 
galleries; we don‘t think that this kind of instruction is a precondition for any 
appreciation of art. We accept that there is a pathway to the appreciation of artworks 
that moves gently uphill from wholly untutored looking through to curatorial levels of 
expertise, with convenient stopping-off places along the way. The doctrine of 
Openness says that such pathways exist, connecting any culture with any other. 
There are no shear aesthetic cliffs that require heroic endeavours before we can 
glimpse the riches above us. 
 
The argument 
What reasons are there for believing Openness? The primary reason I shall offer is a 
simple and perhaps naïve one: that it seems to be the case that people appreciate 
the art of other cultures, and the best explanation for this is that they do, in fact, 
appreciate those arts. I‘ll call this the argument from appearances.  I admit that 
arguments like this need to be treated with care. We must be wary of endorsing 
widely held beliefs which are said to be ―obviously true‖ and which their advocates 
claim to be verified in everyday experience; we need to look closely at what the 
supposed evidence actually is, at anything that looks like counter-evidence, and to 
consider how easily the view in question sits with the rest of our knowledge, 
especially that which has a high degree of systematic verification through experiment 
and reflective theory construction.17 But I believe one would have to work very hard 
to persuade a rational agent not to believe in Openness, given the extent to which it 
appears to be true. Simply attend at any of the many museums that display the 
artefacts of other cultures, and see large numbers of people, apparently, 
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appreciating the objects on display. You may have doubts about the motives of those 
attending; you may suspect that they are there because they feel somehow they 
ought to be; that they are merely faking an interest in and enjoyment concerning 
these objects. But you have, presumably, equal reason to doubt the sincerity of 
those attending a concert of western classical music at the Wigmore Hall or an 
exhibition at the Tate Modern. No doubt there are people in all these groups who 
attend without enjoyment. But is it plausible that most do? And if you acknowledge 
that there is some degree of genuine enthusiasm for Bach or Beuys at these events, 
are you able to give any reasons why we should not conclude the same about 
attendees at ethnographic exhibitions? Do they more obviously give off signs of 
boredom or bad faith? And what about your own case? Unless you exercise a good 
deal of willpower to suppress the tendency, you will very likely observe yourself 
appreciating the exhibits, admiring such things as simplicity of line, apt choice of 
materials, unity of parts, witty representations of facial expression, etc. All this, I say, 
is indicative of the extent to which it seems that we appreciate the art of other 
cultures. 
 
Perhaps it will be said that, in the case of the enthnographic exhibition goers, the 
aesthetic delight is real enough, qua subjective experience, but that it is illusory: 
people think that they are responding to, making contact with, properties of the works 
themselves, but in fact are not. This is also implausible. People are able, to some 
admittedly limited degree, to say what it is they like about these objects, to point to 
particular features which they find interesting or pleasing, to make comparative 
judgements between particular objects and between particular styles of objects. I do 
not think that people untutored in art history behaving comparably in front of artworks 
from the western canon would be accused of undergoing purely illusory experiences 
of aesthetic appreciation. To think that would be a very obvious kind of art snobbery. 
A proper response would surely be to see the behaviour as a promising beginning: 
worthy of encouragement, along, no doubt, with the helpfully critical attitude we apply 
to any learning process. To repeat--the initial capacity of most people to appreciate 
the art of other cultures is limited, sometimes very limited. But, and this is another 
repetition, exactly the same can be said about the majority of attendees at the Tate 
Modern. The issue before us is not whether cultural and artistic neophytes could 
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appreciate these things better—that is true in virtually all cases—but whether they 
appreciate them at all.  
 
A further response to Openness says that western appreciators of traditional art are 
suffering a different kind of illusion: they are finding things to be beautiful (or in some 
other way aesthetic) which are beautiful, but which were not intended to be so; they 
are admiring qualities which they think of as intentionally imposed by the objects‘ 
makers when they were not. I admit that it is possible that these objects are, as it 
were, merely accidentally fitted to appeal to western sensibilities, and that they were 
not intended to have the properties which people find appealing. But this, too, is 
extremely implausible. Who would suppose, in advance of the facts, that the 
artefacts of many non western societies would, just by accident, appeal to the 
aesthetic sensibilities of contemporary westerners? Did God arrange things so that 
objects not intended by their human makers for aesthetic delight just happen to 
delight us? There is something outrageously Eurocentric in the idea that we have 
been singled out for this special benevolence. Furthermore, the testimonial evidence 
we have—and I admit the inconclusiveness of such testimony—goes against the 
hypothesis. A number of careful and sensitive studies indicate that, while the 
aesthetic conversations of traditional, small-scale societies are carried on in ways 
very different from our own, respect for skill and attention to the aesthetic effects skill 
can achieve—effects, that is, which we recognize as aesthetic--are generally 
present.18  
 
Of course there can be mistakes, especially when we start to move upwards towards 
a properly culturally informed appreciation of artefacts: we can miscategorise 
particular works, misunderstand the defining features of particular genres, think that 
an element is functional or meaningful when it isn‘t. These are all mistakes we have 
made and continue to make about art within the bounds of our own cultural history; it 
doesn‘t show that the project of trying to understand these things is hopeless or 
vicious.  
 
Now I admit that, in one respect, the kind of aesthetic attention that artefacts of 
traditional societies are likely to get from a western audience is distorted, if by that 
we mean that it is a different kind of attention from that which these objects would 
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generally get as situated in their home communities. For it will be an attention which 
gives a concentrated and perhaps exclusive focus to the aesthetic properties of 
these things, and it may well be that they were not designed with the intention that 
their (intended) aesthetic properties would be attended to in so concentrated a 
fashion, and that may also not be the way in which people in the society which is 
home to these artefacts would normally or perhaps even ever attend to them. But 
this argument from the balance of attention, while probably correct in its factual 
claim, should not be allowed to unsettle our conviction that we western observers are 
thereby making genuine contact with these works. It is of the nature of 
connoisseurship to focus attention on elements within a work which, while having 
been placed there intentionally, were probably not placed there with the intention that 
they be focused on with that degree of attention. Critics draw attention to the aptness 
of a Shakespearean metaphor, the balance of a line, the precise ways in which a 
speech expresses the disordered mind of the speaker. When we learn about these 
things, we focus on them to a degree vastly greater than anyone in the audience of a 
production would have the opportunity to do; and if they did do that it would 
compromise their engagement with the play as a whole. We do this in a reflective 
mode which Shakespeare was not catering for and probably never foresaw. But in 
doing it, we are finding ways to engage more deeply with the work; why should it be 
different in the case of the artefact of the traditional society? Anyway the argument 
from the balance of attention, if it had any merit, would apply to all sorts of interests 
we might take in these artefacts, including the interests which anthropologists 
regularly do take. When Alfred Gell, a theorist much opposed to the idea of any role 
for aesthetic considerations in anthropology, asks us to reflect on the fear-inducing 
qualities of the Asmat shield he is not thrusting us into battle to face one: he is 
asking us to think about how fearful this would be in those circumstances, which is 
as alien as anything could be to the intended purpose of the artefact.19 
 
Much of the weight of the distortion argument falls on the institution of museums and 
galleries, which are said to present their artefacts in inappropriate ways, wrenching 
them from their proper cultural contexts.20 But this claim cannot be treated as an 
independent move in the argument; it works only for those already profoundly 
skeptical of Openness. Those of us who think that there is a universal aesthetic 
sense may endorse the practice of museum display on the grounds that it is well 
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suited to the bringing out of aesthetic qualities which, in other contexts, would be 
occluded or at least dampend by attention to factors such as practical use, religious 
ceremony, warlike intent, or competition for status. Museums can be more or less 
well suited to the display of these artefacts, their exhibitions more or less 
sympathetic to and informative concerning the symbolic, technical and historical 
situations of their making. But they cannot reasonably be criticized for promoting a 
selective attention to certain aspects of these artefacts; concentrated attention is 
always selective.21 In this connection it is worth quoting the reaction of Kwame 
Anthony Appiah to the exhibition Africa: Art of a Continent which appeared at the 
British Academy and at the Guggenheim, New York, in the mid 90s.  
 
There was too much to see; the labels were too cryptic; some of them, I fear, were, 
as we happened to know, plain wrong. But the consensus over lunch was that the 
show was wonderful; and what made it wonderful was that the eye could linger with 
pleasure on the forms, the shapes, and the surfaces, the patination and the pigment, 
and engage each object with whatever we happened to know of its materials, its 
history, its origin. In short, we found ourselves responding naturally to these African 
artifacts as art.22  
 
Appiah, I think, is as aware as anyone of the distance between the museum display 
and the home culture of these objects, and as anxious as anyone that their cultural 
context be understood. But he also, and consistently, delights in the opportunity for 
the kind of selective focus, where ―the eye could linger with pleasure on the forms‖, 
which the exhibition provides. And, says Appiah, ―to take these African artworks 
seriously does not require us to take them as their makers took them.‖ 
 
4 Art and the philosophers 
The argument from appearances is my first and primary argument for Openness. In 
developing it I have not appealed to any specialised philosophical theory about art 
and the aesthetic, of which there are many. But anthropologists opposed to the 
category of the aesthetic often object that talk of art and the aesthetic is embedded 
in the rarified and highly prescriptive theorising of modern western philosophy, the 
unrestricted application of which distorts our understanding of other cultures and 
their artefacts.23 We ought to consider this claim, especially since the present essay 
comes, suspiciously, from someone who earns a living by the profession of 
philosophy. 
11 
 
 
Openness is the claim that there is a more or less universal sensitivity to the 
aesthetic properties of artefacts. It is not an attempt to characterise, in the manner of 
philosophical analysis, what aesthetic sensitivity is, whether it is principled or rule-
governed, whether aesthetic judgment brings objects under concepts, or to settle 
any other outstanding philosophical issue.  It is like the claim that cricket balls are apt 
to break windows—a claim we are all able to agree on without needing to analyse 
the notion of causation, or defeat Humean scepticism, or to take a view about 
whether causal transactions always involve energy transfer. Nor does practical skill 
generally improve with philosophical understanding.  We don‘t hope to be better at 
causing things to happen by reading about the philosophy of causation, and few 
people are better appreciators of art through reading Kant‘s Critique of Judgement, a 
work often cited by opponents of Universalism as an indication of the narrowness 
and unportability of western conceptions of the aesthetic. At the level of abstraction 
Kant favoured, it is unlikely that anything he said would be of much use to someone 
interested in either Renaissance painting or Sepik River carving. While Kant is 
perhaps an extreme example, western aesthetic writing generally is unhelpful if one 
wants to have a more discerning eye for, or a better understanding of art.  
 
So Openness does not bring to the conversation any heavy-duty philosophy of art, 
and the claim of some anthropologists that the aesthetic is an invention of modern 
western philosophy confuses a phenomenon with philosophical attempts to analyse 
that phenomenon.24 But it is worth saying in addition—though this is by no means a 
claim essential to the defence of Openness--that philosophical theories of art and the 
aesthetic may give us valuable and quite general insights into the nature of aesthetic 
appreciation, in much the way that linguistic theories give us insight into language 
production. Theories of grammar are not understood by competent speakers; if they 
were, progress in the construction of theories of grammar could be made simply by 
consulting the opinions of native speakers about why certain strings are acceptable 
and others are not.25 But theories of grammar may yet help us understand the 
processes of language use, if the distinctions made within the theory correspond to 
causally effective distinctions within the mechanisms of speech comprehension and 
production—mechanisms to which speakers do not have personal access. A 
philosophical theory of the aesthetic is not the same sort of thing as a theory of 
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grammar. A theory of grammar looks for an account of the causal structure of 
language comprehension and production; a philosophical theory of the aesthetic 
seeks an account of the conceptual structure of art and the aesthetic. But they are 
similar in this: neither is limited in its ambitions by the thought that its deliverances do 
not correspond to the intuitive understanding of those who engage in the 
corresponding activity.   
 
I shall not, I repeat, appeal here to philosophically inspired analyses of such 
concepts as art, beauty, the aesthetic, or attention; my strategy throughout is to pay 
regard instead to common practices visible among western audiences who regularly 
do take an interest, apparently aesthetic, in the artefacts of other cultures, to take my 
lead from those practices in identifying the sorts of artefacts that we ought to 
consider, which apparently give pleasure to audiences who attend to and reflect on 
such things as colour, form, quality of making, elegance of design, strikingness of 
expression in a represented face: the sorts of properties which, considered in 
connection with a gallery-object in our own culture, would count as unproblematic 
instances of attention to the aesthetic. But one philosophical commitment I will sign 
up to, as a decision on this issue is crucial to avoiding the accusation that an 
aesthetic approach to artefacts is a kind of pure, context-free—and hence culture-
free--looking. There are suggestions of this view—the one I am going to reject--in 
various philosophically influenced systems: one thinks in this context of such notions 
as aesthetic distance, disinterested contemplation, the independence of aesthetic 
judgement from concepts, and the supposed dependence of aesthetic features on 
such ―appearance properties‖ as colour and shape, volume and texture.26 Within the 
world of art theory and practice something like this view was pressed by Clement 
Greenberg as part of his advocacy of abstract expressionism; Greenberg especially 
emphasised the idea of taste as a kind of context-free sensitivity to the appearances 
of things. This view, often called formalism, offers a relatively thin account of the 
aesthetic domain: it says that, once you know exactly what the object looks like, you 
know everything on which its correct aesthetic characterisation depends. According 
to formalism, what is available to be appreciated in art is entirely a function of what 
can be seen in it.27 Thus a popular response to the discovery of forgery in art is to 
declare those who would remove the offending item from the gallery walls to be 
snobs, on the grounds that the work ―does not look any different after the discovery 
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from the way it looked before‖. Generalising formalism about the visual arts to other 
areas, we may say that what matters in music is the notes played and how they are 
sounded, not who wrote the piece, when and under what circumstances; what 
matters for the novel is the words on the page, not the genre to which it belongs or 
the literary influences on its author. 
 
The minimalist will say that the act of looking or hearing or reading is something that 
involves attention, concentration and acuity, and so is a matter of improvable skill; 
we are not all, automatically, highly competent interpreters and judges of art, even 
on the minimalist account. But those with normally developed senses and, for 
literature, basic literacy count at least as beginners in the looking, hearing or reading 
stakes, and we are all thus provided with a ticket for entry into the world of art, as 
Openness requires. So formalism sounds like a good bet for anyone keen to 
promote Openness. Indeed, Arthur Danto argues that minimalist thinking in the 
twentieth century was influential in creating a more inclusive idea of aesthetic 
activity, de-emphasising the ideas of canon and tradition that previously isolated 
western art from the arts of other cultures, and encouraging the inclusion of those 
arts within the horizon of taste.28  
 
But the cost of this minimalist justification for openness is the severing of art from its 
religious, symbolic and sometimes utilitarian background—a pretence that artworks 
are ―pure appearances‖ made wholly for appearance sake. And the effect of that is 
an impoverishment, not an enhancement, of the work‘s aesthetic richness. Of course 
there is something true in the minimalist‘s claim. On anyone‘s account, the look of 
the picture, the sound of the symphony, the text of the novel are highly important to 
appreciating the work. Let‘s say that acquaintance with these things is acquaintance 
with the appearance of the work, where the appearance, overall, of the work is given 
by the totality of its appearance-properties—properties such as colour and shape 
properties for painting, and word order and spelling for literature. Acquaintance with 
the appearance of the work is a necessary condition for appreciation. It can be 
rational to believe that a painting you have never seen is beautiful—you might have 
been told that it is by an extremely reliable judge of these matters, and in this area as 
in others, knowledge can be transferred by testimony. But belief is not appreciation; 
14 
 
to appreciate the work, you have to see it. The question at issue is whether 
appearance on its own determines the aesthetic properties of the work.29 
 
Surely it does not. As people have often pointed out, it‘s possible (I emphasise the 
word ―possible‖; it certainly isn‘t likely) for a paint spillage to result in something 
visually indistinguishable from an old master painting, or perhaps (a bit more 
plausibly) a Morris Louis abstract. The paint spillage that looked exactly like a work 
of art would be astonishing and no doubt the source of endless interest; it might even 
be beautiful in the way that a sunset or landscape is for those of us who don‘t see 
The Maker‘s hand in nature, though it is more likely to be regarded as simply bizarre.  
But it would not be a work of art, and it would not have the kind of aesthetic appeal 
that we associate with art rather than with nature. In particular, it would not be in any 
sense an achievement, and I believe that the idea of achievement is fundamental to 
our most basic and most universal sense of value in art. Artworks are essentially 
vehicles for the manifestation of skill, imagination, insight and other admired traits; 
that is why we are often concerned with expression in art, for we recognise art as a 
pre-eminently efficient means by which a person‘s qualities and dispositions are 
expressed.30 The psychologist Nick Humphrey puts the point well: 
 
We love beauty through the medium of our senses, but at the same time what we 
love is obviously not merely the sensory stimulus as such. With cheesecake, we 
have only to have the stimulus on our tongue and the right affective buttons will 
be pressed. But with beauty it‘s not so straightforward. For a start we often need 
to be told that this is beauty, before we will respond to it at all… We care deeply 
about genuineness and authenticity. While we find a copy of a slice of 
cheesecake just as tasty as any other version, we find a reproduction of a 
Rembrandt less valuable—and surely less beautiful--than the original. While we 
enjoy the cheesecake for its gustatory qualities without thinking to ask who or 
what made it, we marvel at the cave paintings at Lascaux only because we 
believe they were made by human beings — and if it were to turn out they‘d been 
created by a freak flood they‘d become merely quaint.31 
 
It would be wrong to conclude from this that artworks are merely instruments by 
which we gain access to the really valuable personal qualities they express. We do 
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value the work itself.32 There is a difference between purely instrumental value and 
the derived but intrinsic value I claim is possessed by artworks. Consider a poorly 
composed, dark, and out of focus photograph of a loved one. In such a case the 
photograph is of instrumental value only, and is considered a mode of access to the 
really valuable thing, the person. Works of art, by contrast, are objects which have 
their own value, but it is value they have in virtue of the activity which went into their 
production, and if it turns out that they are natural or accidental products they cease 
to be accorded that kind of value, whatever other value they may have. (I‘ll say more 
about photographs in this connection later.) To understand such varied qualities as 
artistic vision, originality, sensitivity to tradition, respect for the medium, we have to 
do more than simply be exposed to the work‘s appearance, even if we know already 
that it is a work, and not a spillage. We need to know a great deal about its art 
historical context: it‘s genre, it‘s place in historical development, it‘s role in a magical 
or religious belief system, its place in the artist‘s oeuvre, what the artist was trying to 
do, the techniques available to her. That in broad outline is the contextualist‘s 
position, and I agree with it. 
 
Artworks as traces 
It is these historical-cultural aspects of context which philosophers have so rightly 
emphasised recently.33 But this emphasis might be taken to imply that works are 
closed to us when we lack this kind of specialised knowledge, which is not after all 
easily come by, and hence as an indication that Contextualism is inconsistent with 
Openness. This, I will argue, is an unnecessarily pessimistic conclusion. While it is 
true that one cannot arrive at an excellent critical grasp of a work and its qualities 
without this sort of historically and culturally specific understanding, there is a more 
broadly human context in which we as observers participate in virtue of our common 
bodily nature. This participation does not depend on propositional knowledge: 
knowing that such and such is the case. Rather, it provides the scaffolding around 
which our propositionally represented understanding and appreciation of artworks 
may grow. Many linguists say that, for all the apparent divergence between human 
languages, they actually have a good deal in common, since all must conform to the 
constraints set by our first-language acquisition mechanism. This is a controversial 
view, but I suggest that something like it can be said of human aesthetic sensibility: 
while it is a response to forms that seem bewilderingly varied, it is constrained by 
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universal facts about our bodily constitution; Martians with quite different bodies may 
have aesthetic experiences and values that are closed to us, while ours are 
unavailable to them.34 The connection with art that this provides—preconceptual, 
bodily based, and partly invisible to consciousness—is enough, I think, to allow us to 
say that the arts of cultures of which we know little or nothing are, while not 
immediately transparent, also not locked in a safe marked ―do not open before 
passing Ethnography 401‖.  
 
How does this pretheoretic engagement with the work operate? In the arts I am 
considering here, where our focus is on physical artefacts, visual engagement is 
primary: we see the object, and in typical museum conditions we are unlikely to get 
further than seeing. But what we see is not simply patterns of colour and shape. We 
see traces of human activity. Western art-historical scholarship has long recognised 
something of this, notably the power of the drawn line as a mark or trace of the 
artist‘s activity, a power that has encouraged talk of the line as emblematic of the 
artist‘s genius.35 But in most plastic art-making practices we see traces of the artist‘s 
activity, most obviously in brush-strokes, or marks on surfaces that record the 
process of shaping of solid material (an issue I‘ll return to when I consider the origins 
of aesthetic activity), or in the pattern of a woven basket, blanket or rug, all of which, 
being three dimensional structures rather than mere patterns on a surface, provide a 
detailed record of the maker‘s activity.36   
 
What, then, is our response to the seeing of these traces of activity? It is a kind of 
bodily resonance with that very activity, what Vittorio Gallese, one of the discoverers 
of mirror neurons, calls ―intercorporeity — the mutual resonance of intentionally 
meaningful sensory-motor behaviours‖.37 It is not that we actually start to move our 
bodies in response to the sight of a striking artefact—or if we do, that is not the 
response I am indicating. The movements I am speaking of are sometimes said to 
be imagined, though this gives a misleading impression of control, clarity and 
determinacy as to their nature. Neuroscientists, who have a great deal of interest in 
these processes, and well beyond the aesthetic realm, sometimes call them implicit 
or simulated movements. And neural mechanisms which underlie this are currently 
under investigation. Gallese has hypothesised that a related neural system, the so-
called canonical neurons, is implicated in our responses to art. These neurons fire 
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when we grasp an object, but also when we merely see an object that could be 
grasped. It seems that we respond to objects and the opportunities for action which 
they present—their affordances in Gibson‘s terms—by mentally simulating the 
grasping of them.38 The pathology called utilization behaviour, in which people will 
pick up and drink from a glass of water if one is presented, whether thirsty or not, is 
thought to result from a breakdown of the systems which normally keep these implicit 
graspings ―off line‖.39  
 
In addition to experiencing imagined (I‘ll go on using this not quite appropriate term 
in the absence of anything better) interactions with affordance-providing objects, we 
also, it seems, are capable of reliving the movements that shaped the object. Recent 
work in neuroscience confirms the idea that seeing the result of a person‘s behaviour 
can provoke an imagined or simulated movement of a kind that reproduces the 
behaviour. It has been shown that exposure to handwriting produces activation in 
areas of motor cortex which are used in the writing of letters; this activation 
constitutes a simulated movement which, if really executed, would produce the letter; 
this is part of the explanation of how, with surprising ease, we read words into very 
un-word-like squiggles.  Gallese suggest that similar patterns of activation underpin 
our sense of the actions undertaken by artists—the work of Pollock and Giacometti 
being vivid examples. 
 
This system of responses is one that allows development and training. Brain 
scanning studies show the dancers respond more strongly in these ways to the sight 
of people dancing than do non-dancers, and a parallel point holds, not surprisingly, 
of the imagined movements we undertake when we hear a piano being played.40 But 
the system itself is a primitive one in that it is (a) present to some degree in all 
normally developing subjects irrespective of the idiosyncrasies of upbringing, 
education and experience and (b) apt to operate without initiation or control by the 
subject, though we can also initiate imagined movements at will, as when 
experimenters ask us to imagine moving our hands in certain ways, or tapping our 
fingers at a certain rate.  
 
These imagined movements, while often acknowledged on reflection by subjects as 
part of their artistic experience, are generally recessive and hard to describe. They 
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have been largely ignored through the last one hundred years of otherwise 
strenuous aesthetic thinking, partly perhaps because they do not easily submit to 
articulation within a subtle language of criticism; witness Berenson‘s somewhat 
mechanical insistence on ―tactile values‖ as the key to appreciating early 
Renaissance art.41 A more austere mood has prevailed through most of the 20th 
century, exemplified in otherwise divergent theoretical stances: the varieties of 
formalism; the emphasis emerging in anthropology on an intellectualised notion of 
symbolic meaning; certain approaches to abstract expressionism which insisted—
Greenberg again--on a purely visual engagement freed from the illusion of solid 
space. And, as I have noted, the philosophers‘ emphasis on context outlined above 
has been framed in terms of propositional knowledge rather than, as here, in terms 
of affinity of bodily disposition.  
 
We await, I think, a serious empirical study of the role of these implicit movements 
on our aesthetic sense, but a reasonable projection from current research would be 
this: that they give rise, first of all, to a strong bodily sense of the artefactuality of the 
object and to a representation of its manner of making; to a sense—again 
preconceptual and nonpropositional—of the physical skills and levels of effort and 
concentration involved. In this way the object, through its retention of traces of 
making, is expressive of its maker‘s activity—an important feature, I have claimed, in 
our response to art and one which is, to some degree, independent of specialised 
knowledge.42   
 
The idea that art‘s value partly resides in its being a trace of the maker‘s activity 
goes some way towards explaining the controversial status that photography has 
enjoyed, or suffered from, throughout its one hundred and seventy year history. 
What is distinctive of photography, compared to painting, is that it collapses the 
distinction between representation and trace. A painting or other ―hand made‖ image 
is both a representation—in fact a depiction—of its subject and a trace of the artist‘s 
activity. Even where the picture is a self-portrait, there is a distinction to be made 
between the marks on the paper qua elements in the depiction of the subject, and 
those same marks qua traces of the artist‘s activity. But the relation between the 
trace-features of a photograph and what it represents is more intimate: the surface 
features of the photograph are traces of the person who stood in from of the camera, 
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not of the photographer‘s activity, and the photograph represents whoever it does 
represent in virtue of being a trace of that person. 
 
 
Art and the extension of agency 
Suppose an anthropologist, previously hostile to the idea of a universal aesthetic 
sense accepts my arguments. She might respond by saying that the conclusion just 
isn‘t of any interest to anthropology, since the concern of the anthropologists is with 
cultural difference. In response to this two things must be said. The first is that an 
interest in difference, legitimate though it may be, ought not to be built on a denial of 
universality, if the claim of universality is true. If something is true, it ought not to be 
denied. The second is that an interest in difference must also be an interest in 
sameness. One may be interested in the differences between triangles, but only so 
long as one is aware of the necessary similarities between them; it will be a waste of 
time to look for differences in number of sides, for instance. And if one is interested 
in difference, one is interested in the degree of difference. But that can be assessed 
only by having a view about the ways in which things are not different.43 
 
But this is rather too abstract for comfort. Let us make the argument for the 
anthropological relevance of the aesthetic more concrete. Throughout, I‘ve 
emphasised the connection between art objects and the agency behind the object, a 
connection described here largely in terms of expression. Our enjoyment and 
understanding of Renaissance painting, or Yoruba sculpture, or just about anything 
artefactual, depends on our sense—in its most basic form a bodily sense--that the 
object in question is the result of a deliberate and skilful act of making. I want now to 
connect this idea with another, which I take, paradoxically, from a determined 
opponent of the aestheticisation of artefacts from non-Western societies, Alfred Gell. 
Gell argued that artworks need to be understood, primarily, as devices for extending 
the powers of agents.44 This, as he sees it, is an alternative—a much better 
alternative--to the view that artworks should be understood, by the anthropologist, as 
aesthetic. I shall argue that Gell‘s case for the power of art objects as extensions of 
agency is made stronger by appeal to the ideas I have outlined concerning the 
expressive connection between art and artist, and that his case supports, rather than 
undermines, an aesthetic approach to art. 
20 
 
 
How are our views related? I have been saying something about the input side, while 
Gell is concerned with the output side. My thesis was that art attracts us because it is 
the upshot or terminus of the artist‘s activity; Gell is focusing on the way in which art 
is a cause rather than an effect, a cause which extends the powers of agents. But 
the connection here is not hard to see. For objects which are the outcomes of 
agency, and which are highly expressive of that agency, can be expected to carry 
with them some of the authority of the agent, and therefore to have, themselves, 
causal powers in virtue of their being thus expressive. Let us consider an example of 
how this works. Gell discusses the Asmat, a New Guinean tribe living in what is now 
Irian Jaya, whose warlike practices once involved the use of long, body-protecting 
shields covered with remarkable designs.  
 
Gell says that such an object is ―indisputably a work of art of the kind interesting to 
the anthropologist, but its aesthetic properties (for us) are totally irrelevant to its 
anthropological implications‖. For warriors were not interested in the aesthetics of an 
opponent‘s shield; it was there to frighten him.  ―Anthropologically, it is not a 
‗beautiful‘ shield, but a fear-inducing shield‖ (6). But there is no contradiction in 
holding one and the same shield to be both beautiful and fear inducing.45 Indeed, it is 
a very natural thought that the shield is fear-inducing partly because it is beautiful 
(note that beauty is not the same as prettiness). Of course context matters a great 
deal here; the same design displayed in a harmonious situation would not be fear 
inducing. The point is that the design is apt to induce fear in the right circumstances, 
and apt to do so because its design, particularly in regard to the use of jagged lines 
and strong verticals, is expressive of personal characteristics which, in the right 
circumstances, would be fearful.46 Of course strong verticals and jagged lines don‘t 
automatically make for beauty; the beauty here is a function of the overall ―skewed‖ 
symmetry of the piece, the evident quality of the craftsmanship, and other factors 
which, as always, are not easy to localise—we recognise beauty more easily than 
we are able to analyse it. But the beauty of the design and execution add to the 
sense of confidence and power which the piece expresses, and hence contributes to 
its fearful impression. Gell seems to be close to making this point himself when he 
observes that ―their [Asmat shield] designs seem to have been composed in a mood 
of terror‖ (31). At least, he recognises here that there is an importantly expressive 
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element in the power of the work; for expression is generally a matter of something 
seeming to arise from a certain quality of mind or person, as sad music seems, at 
least, to emanate from a sad person, even though it probably didn‘t. But he is surely 
wrong to think that what is expressed is terror, and his efforts to bolster this 
hypothesis only make things worse. An attacking tiger, an enraged opponent, and an 
Asmat shield all look ―terrified‖, he says, creating terror in the victim by convincing 
them that they see their own terror reflected back. It‘s surely much more plausible to 
say that the shield (as well as the opponent and the tiger) look terrifying, and so we 
are terrified by them. And the shield does that by seeming to be expressive of 
characteristics which, in the circumstances of a battle at least, would warrant terror. 
 
This way of seeing the matter suggests that aesthetic considerations sometimes play 
a significant role in anthropological explanation; things are powerful, sometimes, 
partly because they are beautiful. More specifically, they are powerful partly because 
they have that peculiar beauty which is produced by skilful agency and which, 
through the exercise of that skill, manages to express personal qualities we 
associate with power.    
 
Art: A postscript 
Throughout this essay I have used the word ―art‖ without much thought as to the 
delimitation of its meaning, and merely in conformity with the admittedly very loose 
usage of Boas. But anthropologists opposed to an aesthetic approach to art 
sometimes take as liberal—or more liberal—an approach; Gell defines art as, 
roughly, an index of social agency. This would include any artefact and, he says, 
anything found but displayed47 We ought, surely, to do better than this. 
 
While some categorisations seem too inclusive to be useful, it is unlikely that any 
one restriction will be uniquely best. One way ‗art‘ is currently used by philosophers 
is to name the domain of things which exist within a certain institutional setting, 
which they call the art world, and which contains many things which do not have, and 
were not intended to have, significantly aesthetic properties; this approach claims as 
an advantage for itself that it includes the work of conceptual artists (so-called) which 
an aesthetically based account of art struggle with.48 If we adopt the institutional 
theory little of what I have discussed here counts as art. And much of what would 
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then count as art would certainly provide counterexamples to Openness. I do not 
claim that someone from a culture very different from our own would have any initial 
access to what, if anything, is worth appreciating in the works of Joseph Kosuth or 
Robert Barry. These are, arguably, objects that depend for their interest wholly on a 
specific cultural background and do not appeal to an aesthetic sense. And while it is 
sometimes claimed that works of these kinds take their place within the domain of art 
by being counter-aesthetic works—works consciously and manifestly created as 
critical responses to the notion of the aesthetic—and hence as intimately related to 
the concept of the aesthetic, they would not be aesthetic works of the kind to which 
we are given the kind of intuitive and body-based initial access I have described; 
they are works whose relation to the aesthetic is argumentative, and for such works 
no such pre-theoretic access seems to be helpful. 
 
But we can use the term ―art‖ to tag items which are, to some significant degree, 
aesthetically fashioned. Going further, we might propose the following: we‘ll call 
things art when they are significantly aesthetic artefacts made within a social context 
which recognises the practice of aesthetic production, thereby making a tradition of 
that practice; that is how, roughly speaking, the term is used in much anthropological 
discussion. That recognition may come about through the institutions of religion, 
through magical and symbolic practices, through the creation of a critical 
terminology, through the creation of an acknowledged class of artists, or in some 
other way. Such a definition would allow the Dinka‘s cows as art; their practices 
certainly seem to constitute a tradition.  We can refine further; think of the emphasis I 
have given to the idea of aesthetic artefacts being expressive of their maker‘s 
qualities partly through their displaying traces of their makers‘ activities. Adding a 
clause to the effect that the artefacts concerned should bear significant expressive 
traces of making would get rid of the cows; they are just too ―natural‖ looking to meet 
this condition.  
 
At this point we reach about as restrictive a definition as we could go for if we want a 
notion of art for which Universalism is true. Once we start requiring art be the object 
of disinterested attention, or to have been made with a purely aesthetic purpose, or 
to be the product of a person specially designated as an artist, we move into territory 
occupied by a very limited range of communities. There is no arguing, in the 
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abstract, about which of these definitions is right; it depends on our purpose. The 
interest of Universalism and of Openness depends on the fact that—I claim—there 
are ways of conceiving art which make those claims true.  
 
Gregory Currie 
University of Nottingham 
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dancers, Cerebral Cortex, 15 (2005): 1243-1249; also J Haueisen & T. Knosche, 
‖Involuntary motor activity in pianists evoked by music perception‖, Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 13 (2001): 786-792.  
41 For remarks on a school of thinkers which I call the empathists who did take bodily 
involvement seriously, including brief comments on Berenson, see my ‖Empathy for 
objects‖, in A. Coplan and P. Goldie (eds) Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological 
Essays, Oxford University Press, 2010.  
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42 The editors sensibly queried this claim, pointing the practice of artistic 
―readymades‖ such as Duchamp‘s bottle rack. I follow here the tradition of regarding 
such activity as parasitic in the sense that it can be countenanced as art only by dint 
of its commenting on, challenging or otherwise engaging with a more conventional 
artistic practice which involves making.  
43 On commonalities and differences between cultures and their relation to aesthetic 
universals see Brian Boyd, On the Origin of Stories (Cambridge, Mass., The Belnap 
Press, 2009), Chapter 21. 
44 The idea that art extends agency is surely right. It is not even clear that anyone 
would disagree with this: artworks affect people in certain ways, and if your aim is to 
affect them in those ways, making an art work may enable you to do that. Gell 
himself focuses on ways in which art enhances power. Who would dispute that art 
extended the power of the Renaissance church and its priests? Why is the extension 
of agency thesis inconsistent with thinking of art as symbolic? Gell describes the 
construction of the Maori meeting house thus: ―The ridge pole objectifies the 
genealogical continuity of the chiefly line… while the descending rafters indicate the 
proliferation of cadet lines on either side‖ (Art and Agency, 253). But surely it is only 
by convention that there are these associations between poles/rafters and lines of 
descent. Symbols certainly add to the power of an individual or institution. Even 
ordinary communicative uses of artefacts extend our powers in various way; we 
communicate with people because we want to produces changes in their beliefs, 
their desires, or their behaviour. I happen to agree with Gell that art need not be 
symbolic, but I am puzzled as to where he thinks the argument for this, based on the 
efficacy of art, comes from. 
45 Boris Wiseman says, ―From an ‗aesthetic‘ point of view, the Asmat shield can be at 
once a beautiful shield and a fear-inducing shield‖ (Levi-Strauss, Anthropology, and 
Aesthetics, Cambridge University Press, 2007, Introduction). Howard Morphy, 
generally a friend of the asthetic approach to the anthropology of art, says that ―In 
the case of Yolngu art, what Europeans interpret as an aesthetic effect Yolngu 
interpret as a manifestation of ancestral power emanating from the ancestral past‖ 
(From dull to brilliant: the aesthetic of spiritual power among the Yolngu‖, in Coote 
and Shelton (eds) Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1992), p.183. Once again, I see no inconsistency in supposing that these aesthetic 
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effects are part of what explains the capacity of the objects concerned to manifest 
this connection with an ancestral past. 
46 I have in mind here the shield which Gell himself chose to illustrate his point; the 
designs vary somewhat. 
47Gell, Art and Agency, Chapter 2. 
48 See eg, Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca: NY: Cornell 
UP, 1974. Art Circle: A Theory of Art. Chicago: Spectrum Press, 1997. For a recent 
defence of the aesthetic approach to art see N. Zangwill, Aesthetic Creation, Oxford 
University Press, 2007. 
